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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The names of a] 1 parties to the proceedings in the
lower Court are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal,

'

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction : f this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann

§ 78-2-2(3) (j) as amended,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A

Gas-A-Mat Oil Corp. of Colorado.
On the basis of the record before it, did the trial

court,

in i | i ' a n U n q "'i^-A-Mit ' :, M< it mn h i n i sm i s s ,

correctly

determine that the "dual capacity doctrine" did not apply to the
allegations in plaintiff's Complaint?
B.

State Defendants/Appellees:
Gas-A-Mat adopts appellants' Statement of the Ts^es wi th

respect: to the State defendants/appellees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because trie propiun/ ui a h'nle ];"'f b) t Mi dismiss,!! i ". a
question of law, this Honorable Court gives - * rriai courrs
ruling in defeteincp and reviews it under a c:;re:^ness standard,
St. Benedict's

Dev. Co. /

c

t, Benedict's

He*
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196 (Utah 1991).

A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss admits the

facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's
right to relief based on those facts.

Id.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
1.

U t a h Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 0

(1953):

3 5-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer,
or officer, agent or employee—Occupational
disease accepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting
in death or not, shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer and shall be the
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent
or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this
act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents,
next-of-kin, heirs, personal representatives,
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on
account of any accident or injury or death,
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated
or incurred by such employee in the course of
or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be
maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury or death of
an employee. . . .
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1953):

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by
wrongful acts of persons other than employer,
2
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officer/ agent, or employee of said employer
— Rights of employer or insurance carrier in
cause of action — Maintenance of action —
Notice of intention to proceed against third
party — Right to maintain action not
involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which
compensation is payable under this title
shall have been caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of a person other than an employer,
officer, agent, or employee of said employer,
the injured employee, or in case of death his
dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also have an action for
damages against such third person. If
compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of
action against the third party and may bring
and maintain the action either in its own
name or in the name of the injured employee,
or his heirs or the personal representative
of the deceased, provided the employer or
carrier may not settle and release the cause
of action without the consent of the
commission. Before proceeding against the
third party, the injured employee, or, in
case of death, his heirs, shall give written
notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation
payments, in order to give such person a
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance
in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of Section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or
personal representative may also maintain an
action for damages against subcontractors,
general contractors, independent contractors,
property owners or their lessees or assigns,
not occupying an employee-employer
3
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relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such
third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the
action, including attorneys' fees, shall
be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests
may appear. Any such fee chargeable to
the employer or carrier is to be a
credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of
death, by the dependents, for any
recovery had against the third party.
(2) The person liable for compensation
payments shall be reimbursed in full for
all payments made less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees
provided for in Subsection (1).

J

' (3) The balance shall be paid to the
injured employee or his heirs in case of
death, to be applied to reduce or
satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person
liable for compensation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of
Proceedings as Concerns Defendant Gas-A-Mat Corp.
This is a wrongful death action arising out of the
kidnapping and murder of Maurine Hunsaker.

Mrs. Hunsaker was

kidnapped while on duty from her place of employment, a Gas-A-Mat
service station located at 3995 West 4700 South, Salt Lake

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

County, Utah.

Mrs. Hunsaker was employed by Gas-A-Mat as a

cashier, and her duties consisted primarily of monitoring the
customers and receiving payment from them for the products
purchased at the service station.

It was undisputed in the trial

court below that after the death of Mrs. Hunsaker, the plaintiffs
in this case filed for workers compensation benefits under the
Utah Workers Compensation Act and received those benefits.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's invocation of the benefits afforded
under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, plaintiffs filed a
complaint in which they named as a defendant, Mrs. Hunsaker's
employer, Gas-A-Mat Corp.
Plaintiffs specifically allege that in regard to
Mrs. Hunsaker's employment, Gas-A-Mat was acting in a "dual
capacity."

Plaintiffs assert that Gas-A-Mat was acting as both

gasoline retailer and as a provider of security for the
individual Gas-A-Mat stations.
Gas-A-Mat filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's claims
asserting that the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act provides the
exclusive remedy for the death of an employee and that the "dual
capacity" doctrine does not provide an exception to the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Act under Utah law.

It is Gas-A-Mat's

position that Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-60 and 35-1-62, when read
together, clearly indicate that the Utah legislature intended
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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r

employer's immunity from common-law liability to be coterminous
with their liability under the Utah Act.

To the extent an

employer is held liable as a result of the obligations mandated
by the Utah Act, then the employer is entitled to immunity from
common-law liability as provided in the Utah Act,

Disposition in the Court Below
By an Order of Dismissal dated January 28, 1988 and
entered by the clerk on February 1, 1988, the Honorable Richard
Moffat granted Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss,
of Dismissal.)

(R. 127-29, Order

No memorandum decision was issued by the Court.

Relief Sought on Appeal
Gas-A-Mat requests this Court to affirm the decision of
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gas-A-Mat acknowledges that this Court, when
determining whether a trial court properly granted a Rule 12(6)
Motion to Dismiss, will accept the factual allegations in the
Complaint as true.

However, only the well-pled facts of this

plaintiff's Complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory
3

6
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allegations, must be accepted as true.
567, 579 (10th Cir. 1985); Mitchell

Bailey

v. King,

v. Kirk,

111 F.2d

537 F.2d 385, 386

(10th Cir. 1976).
Paragraphs 35 and 36 of plaintiffs' Complaint allege
that at the time Maurine Hunsaker was kidnapped, she was employed
by Gas-A-Mat as a cashier, and that her duties consisted
primarily of monitoring the customers and receiving payments from
them for the products purchased at the service station.

There is

no dispute that at the time of the regrettable incidents that led
to Mrs. Hunsaker's death, she was in the course and scope of her
employment.

There was no dispute at the trial court below that

the plaintiffs in this case had filed for workers compensation
benefits under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and had
received those benefits.

(See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Appellees'
Addendum, p. 1-3.)

(R. 96-98.)

Plaintiffs allege that in regard to Mrs. Hunsaker's
employment, Gas-A-Mat was acting in "two capacities.11
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, 5 37.)

Plaintiffs assert that Gas-A-Mat

was acting as both gasoline retailer and as a provider of
security for the individual Gas-A-Mat stations.
Complaint, ff 39 & 42.)

(Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs further allege that in

respect to its action as a provider of security, Gas-A-Mat was
7
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negligent in failing to provide certain additional security and
surveillance procedures at the various stations.

(Plaintiffs'

Complaint, 55 48-50.)
Plaintiffs7 Complaint does not allege that "Gas-A-Mat
security,11 as opposed to "Gas-A-Mat sales," was a separate and
distinct corporate entity.

Plaintiffs do not support the

conclusory and speculative allegation about "Gas-A-Mat security"
with any factual allegation concerning separate corporate form or
identity.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

(

Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-1-60 makes it clear that the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter the "Act") is the
exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury or

\

death, against the employer and other employees to the exclusion
of "any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law
or otherwise. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62, which permits

{

suits for damages only against persons other than the employer,
must be read in conjunction with the exclusivity provisions of
§ 3 5-1-60.

When the two sections are read together, it becomes

{

clear that the Utah legislature intended the scope of employer's
immunity from common-law liability to c:

^spond to their
{

responsibilities under the Act.
8
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It is undisputed that in Utah, an employer is liable
under the Act for a broad range of foreseeable events set in
motion by an on-the-job injury.

This broad obligation under the

Act, however, also carries with it a broad grant of immunity.

If

the employer is held liable as a result of the obligations
mandated by the Act, then the employer, to the same extent, is
entitled to immunity from common-law liability as provided by
§ 35-1-60.
Adoption of the dual capacity doctrine as advocated by
plaintiffs undermines the policies sought to be achieved by the
Act.

There are an endless number of situations in which

employers engage in a course of conduct which could be construed
as relating to workplace security.

It would be an exercise in

sophistry to attempt to draw any principled line of distinction
between those situations in which employees could sue an employer
and those in which the employee could not sue the employer.
Application of the dual capacity doctrine to the facts
of this case would gut the exclusive remedy provision for tens of
thousands of Utah employees and their employers and the end
result would be the undoing of Utah's workmen's compensation
system.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT
PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR
DEATH OF EMPLOYEE AND "DUAL CAPACITY"
DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION
TO THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE ACT
Under the Utah Act, the right to recover worker's
compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the
employer and the employer's officers, agents, and employees for
work-related injuries, including death.
§ 35-1-60.

Once compensated, the employee has no other legal

remedies against the employer.1
1

Morrill

Utah Code Ann.

v.

J&M Constr.

The statutory scheme is a

Co.,

Inc.,

635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981).

In Morrill,
a mother brought a wrongful death action against her
son's employer after her son was killed during the course of his
employment in a cave-in incident. In rejecting a constitutional
attack on the exclusive remedy provision and in affirming the
granting of summary judgment by the trial court, this court
stated:
Article XVI, Sec. 5 of our Constitution
clearly accepts the exclusive Workmens
Compensation Act remedy from any previous
constitutional interdiction that the right of
action in injury cases and damages therefore
shall not be abrogated. We reaffirm our
previous pronouncements and reaffirm the
principle of exclusivity of right and remedy
in the Workmens Compensation Act, under the
facts of this case. A reading of Title
35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953, makes it clear that the
Act is the exclusive
vehicle for recovery of
compensation for injury or death, against
the
10
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legislative bargain in which the employer is held liable without
fault for the work-related injuries of employees and the employee
is limited to workers compensation as his exclusive remedy,2
A.

Utah Does Not Recognize Dual Capacity Doctrine.
Utah does not recognize the dual capacity doctrine.

Indeed, this Court refused to adopt the dual capacity doctrine in
deciding the case of Bingham v. Lagoon Corp.,
1985).

707 P.2d 678 (Utah

This Court also refused to adopt the dual capacity

doctrine in Stewart

v. CMI Corp.,

In CMI Corp.,

740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987).

the personal representative of a deceased

worker brought a wrongful death action against his employer and a
third-party manufacturer on the theory of strict products
liability.

The plaintiff urged this Court to adopt the "dual

capacity" exception to the workmen's compensation law.
Court reviewed its holding in Lagoon Corp.

This

and- held:

employer and other employees to the exclusion
of "any and all other civil
liability
whatsoever,
at common law or otherwise," and
that it Jbars all next-of-kin

or

dependents,

or anyone else,
from using any other means of
recovery against employers and others named
in and covered by the Act, then the Act
itself.
635 P.2d at 89 (emphasis in original).
2

5ee Development, Utah Worker's Compensation
and
Occupational
Disease Laws, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 573, 573-77.
11
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In that case [Lagoon Corp.],
the plaintiff
asserted that her employer wore two hats:
The first being that of an amusement park
operator; the second, the hard hat of a
contractor which was constructing the
"Colossus" ride at the amusement park. We
there rejected the argument that an employer
occupies a separate capacity and owes
separate duties to his employees as an owner
of the premises than he does generally as an
employer and declined to adopt the dual
capacity doctrine under those circumstances.
We similarly see no clear distinction in this
case between the duties owed by an employer
to furnish safe equipment for its employees
when it purchases those tools, and the duties
owed to its employees to furnish safe
equipment when it has manufactured the tools
itself. The dual capacity doctrine does not
apply in this situation because the employer
has not assumed a separate and distinct
obligation toward his employee other than as
employer.
740 P.2d at 1341-42.
This Court's rejection of the argument that an employer
occupies a separate capacity and owes separate duties to its
employees as an owner of premises (other than it would generally
as an employer) is consistent with other case law and scholarly
commentary.
Workman's

Professor Larson in his treatise 2

Compensation

Larson's

Law, § 72.81 (Desk Ed. 1990), states:

It is held with virtual unanimity that an
employer cannot be sued as an owner or
occupier of land, whether the cause of action
is based on common-law obligations of
landowners or on statutes such as safe place
statutes or structural work acts.

12
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Apart from the basic argument that mere
ownership of land does not endow a person
with a second legal persona or entity, there
is an obvious practical reason requiring this
result. An employer, as part of his
business, will almost always own or occupy a
premises, and maintain them as an integral
part of conducting his business. If every
action and function connected with
maintaining the premises could ground a tort
suit, the concept of exclusiveness of remedy
would be reduced to a shambles.
B.

Dual Capacity Doctrine Has Been Rejected Across the United
States.
As Professor Larson notes in his treatise, the dual

capacity doctrine really "flourished in only two states, Ohio and
California, and even there for only a few years, from 1977 to
1983."

Larson,

supra,

at § 72.81(c).

The California legislature

abolished the dual capacity doctrine and the Ohio Supreme Court
laid the dual capacity doctrine to rest in Schump
Tire

& Rubber

Co.,

v.

Firestone

44 Ohio St. 3d 148, 541 N.E.2d 1040 (1989).3

Adoption of the dual capacity doctrine is inconsistent with
the intent of the Utah legislature as evidenced in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 35-1-60 & 62.

The public policy considerations that underlie

J

The majority of federal courts have also rejected the dual
capacity doctrine as incompatible with the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. See Votteler v.
United States,
904 F.2d 128, 130 (2nd Cir. 1990); Wilder v.
United States,
873 F.2d 285, 288-89 (11th Cir. 1989); Schmidt
v.
United States,
826 F.2d 227, 229-30 (3rd Cir. 1987); Gallo
v.
Foreign
Serv.
Grievance
Bd.f
776 F. Supp. 1478, 1482 (D. Colo.
1991).
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rejection of the dual capacity doctrine are set forth in State
Alaska

v. Purdy,

601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979).

In Purdy,

of

the

claimant received benefits under the state's Workmans
Compensation Act, and then filed suit alleging the State, her
employer, had failed to maintain properly the highway on which
the injury occurred.

The Alaska Supreme Court stated:

Whatever frail vitality the dual capacity
doctrine has in other jurisdictions, we do
not think that it warrants adoption here. To
do so might undermine extensively the
policies sought to be achieved by the
Workmans Compensation Act. There are
endlessly imaginable situations in which an
employer might owe duties to the general
public, or to non-employees, the breach of
which would be asserted to avoid the
exclusive liability provision in our statute.
It would be an enormous, and perhaps illusory
task to draw a principled line of distinction
between those situations in which the
employee could sue and those in which he
could not. The exclusive liability provision
would, in any event, lose much of its
effectiveness, and the workmans compensation
system, as a whole, might be destablized.
601 P.2d at 260. See also,

Estate

of Coates

v. Pacific

Eng'g,

791 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Hawaii 1990) (rejecting dual capacity
doctrine as incompatible with the exclusive remedy provision).
Plaintiffs argue that Gas-A-Mat Corp. had a separate
relationship to plaintiff's decedent when the corporation posted
security signs, installed cashiers' booths, or otherwise took
action as the owner and occupier of the retail gasoline station.
14
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This relationship, however, is a relationship that hundreds, if
not thousands of retail businesses in the State of Utah have with
each of their employees.
The dual capacity doctrine has proved historically to
be the subject of misapplication and abuse and has been rejected
across the United States.4

The common law is a series of

experiments, some of which succeed and some of which fail.

The

dual capacity doctrine is a failed experiment.
The adoption by this Court of plaintiffs' arguments
would result in the modification of the exclusive remedy
provision by judicial fiat.

This court should reject the

plaintiffs' request to interfere with such a comprehensive
legislative scheme.
not judicial action.

Such changes are best left to legislative,
Franke

v. Durkee,

141 Wis.2d 172, 413

4

See Coello v. Tug Mfg. Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) (dual capacity doctrine not recognized in Missouri);
Porter v. Bloit Corp., 391 S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. App. 1990);
Barrett
v. Rogers, 408 Mass. 614, 562 N.E.2d 480, 482-83 (Mass.
1990) (any change in exclusive remedy provision is a public
policy decision for the Legislature); Kaess v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 403 N.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Minn. 1987); Millard v.
Hyplains
Dressed Beef, Inc.,
237 Neb. 907, 468 N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (Neb.
1991); McNeal

v.

Bil-Mar

Foods

of Ohio,

Inc.,

66 Ohio App. 3d

588, 585 N.E.2d 892, 896-97 (Ohio App. 1990); Heimbach v.
Heimbach, 584 A.2d 1008, 1009-11 (Pa. Super. 1991) ("we are aware
that our holding today totally abrogates the doctrine of 'dual
capacity.' Nonetheless, our supreme court's construction of 77
P.S. § 483 as requiring compensation to be the exclusive
liability of the employer for a compensable inquiry can logically
lead to no other conclusion").
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N.W.2d 667, 670 (1987) (creation of exceptions to the exclusive
remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statute is a
matter of general policy and so lies within the province of the
legislatures, not the courts).

POINT H
DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT APPLY
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
In the early morning of July 5, 1982, Shelly Taynton
was at work in a Uni-Marts convenience store as a retail clerk in
Williamsport, Pennsylvania.
Sohmer.

She was shot and killed by David L.

Her father filed an action and named as defendants

Sohmer, Uni-Marts, and the store where Sohmer purchased the gun
used in the shooting.

Taynton's claim against Uni-Marts was

based on the dual capacity doctrine.

Taynton

v. Dersham,

516

A.2d 1241, 1242 (Penn. Super. 1986).
The court noted that Uni-Marts was Ms. Taynton's
employer and that she was on her employer's premises acting in
the furtherance of her employer's business at the time of her
death.

"There is no allegation that she was killed by Sohmer for

reasons personal to her.

It was simply her misfortune to be

minding the store at the time Sohmer entered."

516 A.2d at 1244.

The court concluded under those facts that the exclusive remedy
16
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provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act should
apply.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the dual
capacity doctrine could be invoked so as to remove the exclusive
remedy shield from the employer.

After examining earlier

Pennsylvania precedent, and assuming, arguendo,

that Pennsylvania

law had recognized the dual capacity doctrine, the court found
that it did not apply to the facts of the case before it.
1246.

Id.

at

In rejecting the application of the dual capacity

doctrine, the courts noted that Ms. Taynton's death resulted from
her presence at the store as an employee at the time Sohmer
entered it.

"Her injuries resulted from the fact she was on the

job performing her duties as a retail clerk.

These are precisely

the type of injuries which the legislature intended to include
within the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act."

Id.

Plaintiffs attempt to apply the dual capacity doctrine
to a situation where an employer posts a security notice or
installs cashier's booths stretches even this discredited
doctrine beyond recognition.

It is plaintiffs7 argument that

anytime an employer performs any act that purports to relate to
the security of the workplace, then the employer steps out of its
employment shoes and creates a separate and distinct relationship
with its employees, that is, "provider of security."
17
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In that

situation, according to plaintiffs, the employer then has waived
the protections of the exclusive remedy provision and is subject
to suit by its employees.
Under plaintiffs' theory, the owner of every
convenience store, or other retail shop, that posts a sign that
states that the employees do not carry any bills larger than
$5.00 bills in the cash register after a certain time in the
evening is creating a separate "security relationship" with its
employees and is subject to direct suit by the employees under
the dual capacity doctrine.

If that is indeed the law in the

State of Utah, no employer will be able to afford to lift a
finger to engage in any type of conduct that will make the
workplace safer.

The application of the dual capacity doctrine

to a factual situation such as this achieves the wrong result and
is bad public policy.

See Thomas v. General

Elec.

Co.,

494

S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. 1973) (fact that employer had built fence
around parking lot and hired security guards did not waive
exclusivity remedy under Compensation Act).
This is a case in which plaintiffs attempt to pursue
two theories of recovery rather than plaintiffs asserting claims
against two distinct legal entities.

Posting notices, putting up

security lights, or even fencing parking lots, ought to be and
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are part and parcel of the employer's role as employer.

The dual

capacity doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Gas-A-Mat Corp. respectfully
request that this Court affirm the trial court's decision
granting Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss on the merits and with
prejudice.

DATED this J)

day of

Tjljh^

, 1992.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Gary L.AJohnson
A t t o r i j i ^ s for kpjbellee
Gas-A-Mat Corp.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

MICHAEL JIM HUNSAKER, surviving
spouse of, and
MATT HUNSAKER,
(
NICHOLAS HUNSAKER and
DANA HUNSAKER, minor dependent
children of
MAURINE FORSCHEN HUNSAKER,
deceased,
Applicants,
vs.

Defendants.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

k

k

ft

A

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

AND ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT

*
*
*
*
*
*

GASAMAT OIL COMPANY and/or
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE,

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*

*

*

FINDINGS OF FACT:
On or about May 9, 1986, the carrier in this matter, National Union
Fire Insurance, caused a form 151 to be filed with the Industrial Commission
accepting liability for the industrial injury resulting in the death of
Maurine F. Hunsaker on February 23, 1986, this accident having occurred during
the course or scope of her employment with the defendant, Gasamat Oil
Company*
The defendants indicated that the Applicant was earning $3.50 per
hour working seventeen hours per week, and that the decedent was married with
three minor dependent children.
Pursuant to Section 68 of the Workers'
Compensation Act, the dependents of the deceased are entitled to two-thirds of
her average weekly wage plus $5.00 for each dependent, not to exceed the
average weekly wage of the deceased, which will entitle the dependents to
compensation benefits of $59.50 per week payable for 312 weeks or a total of
$18,564.00.
Following
the expiration of the benefits awarded herein, the
Applicants may be entitled to continued benefits from the carrier, National
Union Fire Insurance.
Whether the dependents are entitled to additional
benefits will depend on the amount of Social Security death benefits they are
receiving at that time. Section 107 of the Act, provides that following the
initial six year period of benefits, the carrier's continuing liability for
benefits is subject to a credit of 50* of any Social Security death benefits
received by the dependents. Therefore, should the Applicants receive more
than $515.00 per month in Social Security benefits, then the Applicants would
be entitled to no further compensation benefits, and pursuant to Section 107
of the Act, the carrier would be liable for the difference between $30,000.00
and the $18,564.00 awarded to the dependents herein, or the sum of $11,436.00
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAURINE FORSCHEN HUNSAKER
FINDING OF FACT
PAGE TWO
which would then be payable to the Default Indemnity Fund as provided in
Section 107.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The dependents of Maurine Forschen Hunsaker are entitled to workers*
compensation benefits as the result of her death of February 23, 1986, which
occurred during the course or scope of her employment with the defendant,
Gasamat Oil Company.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gasamat Oil Company and/or National
Union Fire Insurance pay to Michael Jim Hunsaker for the use and benefit of
himself and the minor dependents of the deceased, compensation at the rate of
$59*50 per-week for 312 weeks or a total of $18,564.00,-which compensation
shall commence effective February 24 f 1986, with accrued amounts due and owing
in a lump sum.
]

(

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that National Union Fire Insurance shall pay
the Applicants interest tof -&L per -annum on -the benefits accrued -between
February 24, 1986 and the date they make their.first payment of the benefits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, Gasamat Oil Company and/or
National Union Fire Insurance, pay 'Richard ~C.^Hutchison, attorney for "the
Applicants,v-the .sum of *$160.00,"*for services rendered j.n this matter, the same
to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the Applicants and remitted
directly to his office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, Gasamat Oil Company and/or
National Union Fire Insurance, pay the statutory -funeral ^allowance -of
$1,800.00 «to Michael «J.^Hunsaker, the same to be paid in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
21
day of May, 1986
ATTEST:

/s/

Linda
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J. Strasburg

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on May 21 , 1986 a copy of the attached Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Michael J. Hunsaker, 4887 South A900 West, Kearns, Utah
Richard C. Hutchison, Attorney,
Midvale, Utah 84047

84118

7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite 570,

National Union Fire Insurance, X American International Adjusting,
P.O. Box 6159, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attn: Diane Bamett
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default

Indemnity Fund

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

Barbara
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